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Modernism or Modern ISMS?
Notes on an Epistemological Problem
in Design History
One of the biggest theoretical challenges when study-ing design history is that of navigating throughthe terminological mine field. Subjects related to
design and the 20th century are saturated with terms and
phrases which are vague, complex, ambiguous and biased.
Terms like “modern”, “design” or “functionalism” are incre-
dibly intangible. In today’s public sphere this becomes evi-
dent whenever you flip through a newspaper and are hit by
ads for cars with “modern, yet classic lines” (make up your
mind!), “design furniture” (as opposed to what?) and newly
built “functionalist” houses (In the 21st century !). But also
in more professional and academic settings these terms are
quite troublesome and their meanings and contents are
certainly not thoroughly consolidated.
What is modern? What is modernity? What is modernism?
Studying 20th century design demands a closer investigation
of these somewhat blurry notions. We need to map the field in
order to facilitate scientific distinctions between terms descri-
bing the whims of the latest fashion and those describing the
philosophy of recent centuries. Terminological discussions are
an important part of the epistemology and meta- theory of any
scientific discipline.
In the case of architectural and design studies there is an
abundance of classifying and analytic terms which are largely
taken for granted. Of these, a little explored but yet commonly
used is the phenomenon of isms. In much architectural and
design history literature, the nature of isms is taken for granted
and rarely debated explicitly. As Omar Calabrese has pointed
out, terms constructed as tools of classification, like isms gene-
rally are, are troublesome in that they often make use of key
words designed to unify and connect their subject matter. But
to function this way, these denominators have to be extremely
simplifying and abstract, and thus become obstacles to any
rewarding comprehension of history.1
In the quest for a more nuanced and dynamic under-
standing, I find this situation utterly troublesome. Thus,
This article addresses an epistemological problem best described
as the insufficiently scrutinising use of ism-suffixed terms
as categorising and analytic tools in the fields of architectural and
design history. It seeks to explore the enigmatic nature of isms
and proposes methodological frameworks for their reading
and interpretation.
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further inquiries into this field of research seem highly opp-
ortune. And in embarking on this work, we might build a
more solid foundation for an academic discipline with a self-
expressed lack of theoretical tradition and methodological
tools.
In taking on such a task, numerous questions spring to
mind. What is an ism? In order to find out, we must deter-
mine how it is constructed, negotiated, mediated, consoli-
dated and decomposed. How is an ism formed and then
transformed? Is there room for negotiations and temporal
changes? Isms are often portrayed as discrete entities, but
experience still shows evidence of one ism encompassing
other isms, overlapping each other, or even running parallel
to each other. Are isms equivalent, comparable phenomena,
or does each ism operate on a separate level? We also need to
explore the relations between isms describing systems of
beliefs or epistemes and those describing aesthetic movements
or styles.
To undertake a fundamental critique of the (mis)use of
these meta-terms is difficult. In order to make sense, it must
to a large extent take place within the realm of design dis-
course, which itself is infested by these very meta-terms.
Comprehensive analysis of the core issues of design can
hardly be achieved without using the terms and language of
the design discourse. In other words: we set out to discuss
and criticise elements which are indispensable for design
history. This problem seems to correspond with Otto Neu-
rath’s metaphoric story of science as a ship undergoing
reconstruction in mid-sea.2 The only materials available are
those already on board, plus whatever might be found at
sea. The ship in its present condition is the academic tradi-
tion in which we stand. This can only be developed and
reconstructed by reconfiguring and rethinking existing
terms and ideas, e.g. by profiting from work conducted in
related academic disciplines. The additional help (drift-
wood) – which Neurath might be underestimating – can,
in our case, come from design practice. So, like Neurath,
we must reconstruct the language of the design discourse in
order to question and discuss the fundamental terms and
notions of interest for further inquiry.
In the following I will discuss some of the above mentioned
questions and their application to design history. First, we
need a brief historical outline of the fundamental terms
modern, modernity and modernism. This part is by no
means any attempt to conduct a comprehensive investigation
of this vast philosophical subject matter, but a brief outline
is nevertheless essencial as a backdrop for the subsequent
discussion. Moreover, a clarification of the relation between
aesthetic ideologies and the structures of society is required.
My main focus will then be to investigate the nature of isms
as tools of classification and analysis, especially when applied
to 20th century architecture and design – i.e. in the context
of modernism and its etymologically derived isms. Then I
will discuss the problems and challenges posed by reading
isms in the context of research.
Concise definition-type answers to these questions are
of course mere utopia, so my aim is rather to suggest a frame-
work for improved comprehension in further studies.
Modern, modernity, modernism
Understanding 20th century architecture and design is incon-
ceivable without somehow relating to modernism and its
etymologically derived isms such as e.g. proto-modernism,
late-modernism, post-modernism, neo-modernism, etc. All
these ideologies and modes of thought, and consequently
the entire field of study, becomes tangible only after a closer
examination of the stem of these terms – modern – even
though, within the limited space available in this context,
such an etymological history must be brief and incomplete.
The first known use of the term modern originates from
a papal letter from ad 494. The adjective was used to dis-
tinguish the new decrees from the old. Even though the
meaning of the word has varied and been used both as
positive and negative descriptions of phenomena, persons
and things, the fundamental understanding has always
been dominated by the distinction between the new, the
present and the former, the past.3 Today, this is still the
dominating opinion. The Longman Dictionary defines
modern as
1 time belonging to the present time or most recent time […]
2 made or done using the most recent methods […] 3 using
or willing to use very recent ideas, fashions, or ways of thin-
king4
To our ends, this understanding of modern is not very
helpful, because of its time- relative character. It implies
that all times has once been new, present, and hence mo-
dern. It is more or less synonymous with contemporary.
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What is modern today, will not be tomorrow. Thus, mo-
dern does not bring us any closer to our task.
A term derived from the adjective modern, is the noun
modernity. The latter shows up in the French culture debate
of the mid-nineteenth century, and is often connected to
the poet Charles Baudelaire. He made it a key-word in his
program for a new aesthetic. The term’s time of conception
is crucial to its understanding. The development in tech-
nology and science since the renaissance and the rational
division of labour which followed the industrial revolution
had resulted in a permanent change in the entire social life
and a dissolution of the traditional culture. Add to that po-
pulation growth, urbanization, and the rapid development
of communication and information infrastructure. In times
like these, some elements of society and culture seem to
prevail by means of tradition and conservative forces, while
other elements tend to facilitate alterations through upheaval,
innovation and instability.5
Baudelaire’s visions of modernity are complex, and more
often than not characterized by equivocations, sometimes
even contradictions.6 According to one of his more enig-
matic visions of modernity, the modern aesthetic is dual:
On one hand, modern art contains an element of relativity
regarding the epoch’s fashion and distinguishing features.
On the other hand, it contains an eternal, constant element
of beauty. Baudelaire considered it the artist’s task
to extract from fashion whatever element it may contain of poe-
try within history, to distil the eternal from the transitory. [...] In
short, for any ‘modernity’ to be worthy of one day taking its place
as ‘antiquity’, it is necessary for the mysterious beauty which
human life accidentally puts into it to be distilled from it.7
But modernity’s concept of novelty is essentially different
from what we today conceive as the ephemeral novelty of
fashion.8 The latter is an abstract, discontinuous novelty,
while the genuinely new and present which is strived for in
Baudelaire’s modernity always contains tradition – also
when it takes form of negation. Because with fashion’s
change for change’s sake, any substantial value is lost and
any wish for true rupture is rendered impossible. Change as
formal play abolishes completely the idea of progress which
is embedded in the concept of modernity.
The literary historian Matei Calinescu identifies the exis-
tence of two distinct and at times contradicting modernities.
The first is modernity as a rationale of society, or a field of
experience – characterized by scientific and technological
progress, the industrial revolution, and the enormous so-
cial and economic revolts which followed capitalism. The
other is modernity as aesthetic concept.9
The first type of modernity is described by Calinescu as
bourgeois and characterized by the doctrine of progress,
faith in technology and science, pragmatism, and the ido-
lizing of action and success. The other type of modernity he
describes as anti-bourgeois and characterized by radical att-
itudes, the wish for a rupture with the established order,
idealism, and a focus on the new role of art and culture.
This dual concept of modernity becomes essential when we
move on to discuss its manifestation in industrial design,
but first we shall present a third related term – modernism.
There is a strong consensus that modernism describes an
international tendency implemented in literature, music,
theatre, painting, and other cultural expressions from the
late nineteenth century onwards. The first known use of
the term originates from the author Rubén Dario in the
early 1890’s. And it was within the Hispanic culture it first
took shape of a large, relatively synchronized movement for
aesthetic renovation.10 Modernism can be seen as a cons-
tant quest for modernity, or the wish to establish an anti-
traditional tradition.
This is what has led many scholars to deem modernism
an applicable term in historical analysis. Modernism, as
opposed to modern and modernity, describes (although in
a bafflingly vague manner) a movement or tendency which,
it is often claimed, can be defined as an epoch in history and
is unrelated to the constantly changing present. Because in
modernism, the synonymity between modern and contem-
porary ceases. But here the consensus ends and the episte-
mological challenges pick up momentum.
Modernism is a surprisingly comprehensive and thus
imprecise term. In architecture, for instance, it is used to
describe practices as diverse as e.g. Spanish art nouveau and
the world-wide suburban brutalism of the 1970s. In design,
the ambiguity of modernism might be exemplified by poin-
ting to the correspondence between the two opposed moder-
nities identified by Calinescu and the two most distinct
directions of modernist design – North American styling or
streamlining seems to build on the pragmatic, progress-
oriented type of modernity, while Central European functio-
84 Nordisk Arkitekturforskning 2004: 4
nalism seems to build on the idealistic, radical type of moder-
nity. Taken to extremes, these two design ideologies might
even be labelled kitsch and avant-garde respectively.
To complicate matters even further, we should note that
the meaning of the term differs considerably by variables
such as geography, languages, and time. The Modernismus
of 1920’s Germany does not have the exact same meaning
and content as the Modernism of 1960’s USA.
The vagueness of the term notwithstanding, modernism
is an important and adequate term, because it itself was an
integral part of the items and cultural reality it is used to
describe. Thus, the term participated in creating the history,
and was not, like so many other comparable terms, created
post facto.11
By virtue of its sheer impact on 20th century architec-
ture and design, the term modernism can not be done away
with. But due to its complexity and comprehensiveness, an
adequate theoretical foundation and corresponding methodo-
logy is needed to tackle its appearance in situations subject
to our analysis. I will return to some of the properties and
characteristics of modernism in the next sections, within
the discussion on that intriguing phenomenon called isms.
Isms vs. epistemes
Before any further investigation into the enigma of isms
can take place, we need to make an important distinction.
Some of the more comprehensive isms of the 20th century
denote much more than “just” a more or less consistent set
of aesthetic beliefs or styles. The most prominent ones I
have in mind are modernism and post-modernism. These
terms are used in a far more complex and far-reaching man-
ner than e.g. cubism or neorationalism and by a far more
comprehensive array of academic disciplines than studies
of art, architecture and design. They are used extensively in
e.g. philosophy, sociology, and history, where their mean-
ings are constituted by factors of a completely different nature
than within the aesthetic disciplines, although some over-
lapping of course can be found. But the fact remains that
we are faced with two qualitatively distinct phenomena
which share terminology. To avoid confusion, a closer defi-
nition of the two is needed.
When a philosopher or a historian uses the terms mo-
dernism or post-modernism he or she normally does not
primarily refer to modes of aesthetic thought or artistic
movements. What he has in mind is usually a much wider
and profound socio-historical phenomenon – a system of
beliefs, a world view, or an episteme. The philosopher Michel
Foucault sees these epistemes as society’s structuring condi-
tions, made up of discursive formations which are specific
for any given epoch.12 What is possible to do and think at
any given time is at the mercy of these underlying forma-
tions and their structure. He exemplifies by comparing the
premises of 18th century science:
[T]he naturalists, economists, and grammarians employed
the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study,
to form their concepts, to build their theories. It is these
rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own
right, but are to be found only in wildly differing theories,
concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by
isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called,
somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological.13 (my italics)
Foucault continues:
what I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological
field, the episteme in which knowledge… manifests a history
… of its conditions of possibility… Such an enterprise is not so
much a history… as an ’archaeology’.14 (my italics)
So, by conducting an archaeology of science, we may identify
and understand the formations structuring the intellectual
and creative achievements of different times and cultures.
According to Foucault it is the episteme which both restricts
and affords the discussive and visual possibilities of any given
society.15 The modes and themes of discussion, appreciation,
comprehension and thought are governed or facilitated by
the episteme in force.
In other words we are dealing with two different types of
change which take place on different levels and in different
contexts. The first type is the aesthetic movements or isms
which shift relatively frequent and are said to supersede each
other, the next seemingly revolutionary and utterly distinct
from the prior. The second type is the epistemes – the deep,
fundamental sociological structures and more lasting views
and modes of thought and comprehension. From now on I
will reserve the term isms to denote the first type of phe-
nomena, and refer to the second type as epistemes.
The two are interdependent in a double hermeneutic
sense if we consider isms as social actors or actor networks
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and epistemes as society or world.16 The sociologist Anthony
Giddens describes this relation as double hermeneutics. The
epistemes or world we all share is interpreted and shaped by
the actor networks or isms themselves. But at the same time
the isms are not autonomous entities. They are shaped by
the formations which constitute the world or episteme. Thus,
to understand any sociological phenomenon, we need to
regard the actors’ own view of themselves and the world,
but also interpret their actions and beliefs within the larger
framework of world or episteme.17
It is first when isms are reflected against their time’s
conventions, established rules and dominating debates,
and their material manifestations in form of new art, archi-
tecture, and design become visible against the existing, that
isms become apprehensible and feasible. The epoch’s ever
slowly changing episteme both restricts and affords what is
possible to say, think, comprehend, and do at any given
time. This is where the rules which constitute our actions
come into being. Here, the situations in which our intentions
are embedded arise. This is the background against which
every new ism takes shape.
The fundamental nature of architecture and design is
decided by conventions and traditions as well as how actors
choose to interpret it; whether it is considered as art, utensil,
aesthetic phenomenon, technological system, social state-
ment, symbol, or communication tool. Thus, architecture
and design can portray vastly different properties, depen-
ding on the actors’ choice of perspective and interest.
However, any such choice of perspective is unavoidably
a result of the knowledge, experiences, conventions, and
debates which constitute the governing episteme. The domi-
nating values, established modes of thought, and accepted
opinions restrict and afford these choices.18 Every ism is
embedded in and dependent upon the episteme in force,
whether it expresses celebration and exploration of the
episteme’s core values or rather rebellion and negation of
the same.
What is an ism?
Art history, architectural history, design history and all other
academic disciplines concerned with aesthetics in one way
or another, has no choice but to deal with the phenomenon
of isms. Even historians of science and technology have to
cope with isms, although in a somewhat different manner.
But what are these creations? What do they include/exclude?
How are they constructed? How do they develop? And how
do we relate to them from a scientific standpoint?
Colloquially, isms are often seen as theories (of art, archi-
tecture or design). Isms and theories might have some com-
mon denominators, but the two terms can hardly be consi-
dered synonymous. A (scientific) theory is normally defined
as a logically and/or empirically based set of terms, methods
and explanatory systems designed to structure or explain a
given phenomenon. Bearing this definition in mind, it
seems obvious that an ism can not be regarded as a theory.
First of all, isms differ very much from each other in terms
of to what extent they promote a holistic view, an objective
scope, a rational approach, and an empirical foundation.
Some pretend to supply the answer to all the problems of
the world and promise world peace and happiness for all,
while some operate on a more internalistic and subjective
level.
Secondly, isms are, more often than not, based on a com-
pilation of (pseudo-) scientific and (pseudo-) philosophical
fragments collected in order to act as indisputable facts in
support of the ism. Thus, they can not be said to represent
any holistic view or logically based system.
Moreover, isms are dogmatic, evangelistic, and program-
matic by nature, and hence a far cry from the (alleged)
objectivity of scientific theories. This is, of course, a too
rigid and schematic outline. Even though scientific theories
often pass for objective systems of logic, one need not wander
too far off track to accept the notion of theories (facts) as
results of social construction in the same way as artefacts
are.
We are now at what I believe to be the core of the nature
of isms. They are normative, pragmatic, instrumental, and
they are contemporary. Their normative character is quite
obvious. They tend to propose or dictate how art/architecture/
design should be. While theories are structural or explana-
tory – i.e. pretend to tell us how things are, isms preach the
gospel of how things should be. This important property
poses fundamental challenges for research into the domain
of isms. I will address this in the next section.
Erik Nygaard has also pointed out these normative, dog-
matic and evangelistic functions within the field of archi-
tectural theory, but without abandoning the term theory like
I suggest to do for the sake of terminological intelligibility.
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He has, however, tried to diversify and distinguish between
different types or levels of theories – identifying a field con-
sisting of manifestoes, architectural theory, and architectural
science, flanked with architectural criticism and history.19
This is an important distinction which can help improve
the tangibility and level of precision in the history of ideas.
But because the construction of design ideologies, just like
that of artefacts and scientific theories, is a collective action,
they are transformed over time. Isms can not be compre-
hended by studying exclusively their origin and what is com-
monly perceived to be their authors, because their faith really
is in the hands of future mediators and users.20 And in order to
cope with this flexible and dynamic nature of isms, we need
additional theoretical frameworks and methodological tools.
As a prolongation of its normative nature, isms are highly
pragmatic, or instrumental. Not only do they suggest how
things should be, they normally also supply the methods
with which to achieve the desired state. This instrumental-
ism gives isms a dualistic character. An ism may be conside-
red a set of properties common to a body of buildings or
artefacts – i.e. a style, a practice of designing. Or, it can be
considered an ideological superstructure which in turn
evokes buildings or artefacts more or less corresponding to
the ideology.
The most common and rewarding stand to take is some-
where in between these two extremes. An ism can, as shown
above, be characterized as an ideology. But it can not con-
solidate, develop, transform, or be preserved without the
active participation of the buildings or artefacts in question
as well as human actors. Isms are thus taking the form of
systems consisting of complex actor networks, and should
be treated as such. This position again, draws our attention
to the relation between ideology and practice. The discre-
pancy between ideology and practice is an intriguing pheno-
menon which might pose interesting questions regarding
the formation and transformation of isms. (e.g. the role and
nature of canon). This fascinating and intricate relation
deserves far more attention than what is feasible here. But I
will suggest that there is a transitional aspect to this relation
– an ism as a style can hardly exist until an ism as an ideo-
logy has been proposed and to a certain extent disseminated.
So, to keep from losing track and to conform with the
methodological problems of the next section, I will for the
time being mainly consider isms as ideologies.
The other core property of isms is their contemporary
connection. Isms are products of the time, society and
episteme they arise in. An ism is formed as a response or
reaction to the existing praxis and governing ideas within
the prevalent episteme. In other words, a new ism depends
on both contemporary society and history. The episteme in
force poses restrictions and affordances on what is possible
to think, mean, say and do at any given time, and thus also
on the nature of the ism under formation. But we must not
forget that this relation is reciprocal – the isms in their turn
are actors in the ever continuous development of society and
episteme.
A striking characteristic of many – if not all – isms is their
claim of novelty and revolution. Although both arguments,
methods and rhetoric differ vastly, an ism arises from the
believed need for an abolition, or at least a thorough revi-
sion of the old and existing order in favour of a brand new
order more in step with present beliefs and ideas. But this
claim of novelty suffers from lack of dynamics. Due to the
normative and programmatic nature of isms, they tend to
legitimatize the need for revolution which they proclaim by
passing judgement on history and contemporary society in
a remarkably prejudiced manner. The old and existing or-
der is seen as a static, monolithic entity, and so is – strangely
enough - the new envisioned order as well. But the rhetoric
notwithstanding, any new ism is always a change of the
existing order and always change in relation to the existing
order.
This is also a reason why revivalist isms like neoclassicism
or neomodernism never are just replicas of the original,
referred isms. Any neo–ism arises in a time, society and
episteme vastly different from the original and must there-
fore be of a completely different nature and based on an
ideological foundation which may even be in direct conflict
with that of the referred ism. The prefix neo implies historic
revival. Neomodernism is thus based on a revival of or at
least an hommage to an earlier ism. The pioneers of moder-
nism would never have accepted such a thought. To modernist
missionaries neomodernists would be thoroughbred heretics.
From these inquiries we may deduce that isms are not
theories as this term was defined above, but rather, like
Finn Werne proposes, ideologies.21 They are more or less
consistent sets of beliefs and arguments about what is correct,
important and possible at the given time within the given
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episteme. By treating isms as ideologies instead of theories,
we also facilitate our analysis by rendering their normative,
doctrinaire, and relative nature more evident.22
A rather common misconception, whether seen as theo-
ries or ideologies, is that isms are considered as more or less
static and homogeneous entities. They thus become buil-
ding blocks, clearly defined and with uniform content, which
are placed after each other to make up the chronological
history of art, architecture or design. If this were the case,
historical research would be deceptively easy, but also utterly
uninteresting and unnecessary. Fortunately, this is not so.
Isms change over time and in space. Like any other social
phenomena, they undergo changes and develop constantly
from their conception to their eventual passing, and also
through their crusades through different regions and societies.
Christian religion is not the same in ancient Rome as in tv-
evangelized Hollywood. Nor is modernist design the same
at Bauhaus as at the XII Triennale di Milano. This transforma-
tion takes place through a process of negotiation between all
the involved actors. It is also a part of the change society at
large undergoes restlessly, and it all develops in an intert-
wined relation to the episteme in force.
But how, and where does an ism arise? There is a dogma
which says that art is created in the studio, while isms are
created in the galleries. Whether the first part of this assertion
is true for fine arts is out of my scope, but it is in my view
certainly not true for architecture and design. Art has tradi-
tionally been seen as relatively autonomous – although this
myth has been challenged lately with reference to the artist’s
relations to market, conventions, etc. Architecture and de-
sign, on the other hand, is far from autonomous – the
creative process is entangled by such an array of actors with
different agendas as to prevent any notion of autonomous
“studio creation”. But the second part of the assertion –
isms are created in the galleries – is interesting if we interpret
galleries in a broad sense. By galleries, we should understand
the network of social institutions, actors, and mechanisms
involved in the socio-cultural reception, interpretation,
and domestication of art, buildings, and products.
One artist, architect or designer does not create a new
ism by himself. It it first when an array of actors agree on
attributing a more or less consistent set of properties and
qualities to a group, school or generation that an ism is
constituted. These actors can be, in addition to the artists,
architects and designers themselves, gallery owners, com-
missionaires, cultural critics, journalists, writers, editors,
academics, and many others. In some cases, the artists,
architects or designers who are assigned to an ism by this
powerful actor network themselves flat out refuse to be asso-
ciated with the ism constructed for them or on their behalf.
Pierre Bourdieu has criticised society’s need to label its
cultural production in the above described manner fiercely.
He even claims that this vulgar quasi-intellectual media frenzy
is what every aspect of cultural production has in common.23
Quite an extreme point of view which turns all attempts at
public cultural criticism into fashion statements and tactical
positioning, but it is an interesting perspective to bear in
mind when dealing with isms. I believe the actors involved
in the forming of an ism, at least when considering archi-
tecture and design, to be of a more varied character than
just media clowns, and their agenda to be more nuanced
than mere self-promotion and tactics. The function of these
midwives of isms lead us to a related theme; that of an ism’s
upbringing and aging.
Bourdieu also attacks the labels themselves – he claims
that the names that are assigned to groups, schools, etc. (i.e.
also isms) are false terms and merely practical tools of clas-
sification which create similarities and differences simply
by naming them. The only reason why they have become
important and powerful is because their function is to iden-
tify persons, objects and interests – to separate those inside
from those outside, the existing and outstanding from the
oblivion of ordinariness.24 Again, I find Bourdieu’s criticism
a bit too drastic and harsh, but not without important
insight. It points to a critical problem in architectural and
design studies, namely that isms tend to be viewed as homo-
genized entities and thus create similarities and differences
which might not really exist or at least not as distinct as
the artificial boundaries of isms lead us to believe. It also
raises the question of whether the practical tool of classific-
ation which isms represent really is the most adequate tool
we posses, or if it is time to search for new instruments in
our analytic work.
After the initial, struggling phase, the new ism is either
fought off and marginalized or it is accepted by a suffici-
ently large community so that it can flourish. In both cases
it takes its place in history, either at the junk yard of ideo-
logies and forgotten intentions, or at the centre court of
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society’s ideological entrepreneurs. But since all new isms
are so closely tied to the Zeitgeist of their own times, they are
also doomed to become passé sooner or later. This is rather
intriguing considering the fact that every new ism must
insist on its own novel, ground breaking character at the
expense of the existing order’s wrong, obsolete arguments
in order to succeed. But even the most revolutionary ism
eventually loses its provocative abilities and becomes tradi-
tion. The most striking example of this paradox is probably
the proliferation of functionalism during the interwar years
commented by Theodor Adorno in the most severe man-
ner; “the absolute rejection of style becomes style.”25
In order to explain this transition of an ism from avant-
garde to mainstream tendency or forgotten obscurity Finn
Werne uses the terms intentional context and extentional
context. By extentional context he refers to a project’s rela-
tion to the world at large, to the governing episteme of the
time. By intentional context he refers to a project’s relation
to the architect’s world of ideas, to his will to novelty. He
elaborates:
The type of intention I speak of here reveals itself through
deviation, both in discussive and in visible form, from what
is generally accepted at a given time. The extentional reveals
itself through the common, the accepted, through use, custom
and tradition, while the intentional reveals itself through
the special, the novel, the diverging and marginal. (my trans-
lation)26
Werne then ties the extentional context to the term style and
the intentional to isms. A style refers to a certain part of the
extentional context, to an already established ism which serves
as legitimatizing identity for the project. But the ephemeral
character of the avant garde necessitates a transitional process:
The ism is thus characterized, more or less, by a number of
criteria which are specific for a particular complex of ideas
which only during a relatively limited period can remain inten-
tional but which subsequently transforms into an extentional
context as the ideas win general approval, become what we
call general knowledge, or are passed on to history’s eternal
hide-outs of lost and forgotten intentions. (my translation)27
This part of Werne’s argument is interesting because it
points to a crucial, but insufficiently examined property of
isms – the inexorable transformation of ideology as it moves
through society. Avant garde isms become conservative styles
even when their most prominent and powerful arguments
are based on the rejection of such a development. The pioneer
revolutionaries of a movement soon enough become the
reactionary clergy condemning any development of the
isms which exceed or transcend their own original intentions.
I do not subscribe to Werne’s strict connection between
the avant garde ism and the intentional context. If this ar-
gument should hold, it would require a situation where an
intentional context could take form segregated from any
extentional context. Based on the former discussion of the
relation between epistemes and isms, I find this premise
infeasible. In my view, an ism takes form as a sort of dialectic
negotiation between the intentional and the extentional
contexts. As shown in the previous section, an intentional
context is afforded and restricted by the episteme in force.
An ism is thus both intentional and extentional from the
very conception.
But still, the proposition of isms as changing entities is a
strong and useful one. It can also, I believe, successfully be
extended to follow the ism’s further development. We must
not fall into the trap of believing that an ism is consolidated
and homogenized once it has lost its avant garde status and
is disseminated as the prevalent ideology. An ism never stops
changing. It is therefore of great importance to study how
an ism develops after it has passed through the transition
from intentional to extentional, from avant garde to conser-
vative, from ism to style. This development should be seen
as a reciprocal process of domestication, where society and
the actor network shapes and transforms the ism, and the
ism shapes and transforms society and the actors. Society
does not consist of a continuous row of avant garde inten-
tions. Thus by analysing an ism’s coming of age, and not
exclusively its origin and conception, we might gain impor-
tant, new knowledge we would otherwise miss out on.
It should now be clear that isms are far more complex
and dynamic phenomena than they are often portrayed as.
In addition to the issues under discussion here, the biggest
problem in my opinion is that the varying nature of the dif-
ferent isms make it difficult, if not impossible to relate to
extensive, holistic isms like e.g. modernism in the same way
as to more particular, narrow isms like e.g. neorationalism.
But if we are aware of this challenge, we are much better
equipped to search for its solution.
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Reading isms
Architectural and design history is often dangerously close
to the writing of myths. It is my belief that much of this
hazard can be attributed to the mythical character which
has been assigned to the phenomenon currently under
debate; isms. The origin of this mythical character of isms
can be found in the texts which – together with the canonized
works – constitute the primary sources of knowledge on the
isms’ nature for historical research.
When approaching the phenomenon of an ism, or more
precisely the texts embedded in it and the texts describing/
explaining/interpreting it, one immediately comes across the
insider/outsider problem. By texts embedded in a given ism,
I mean texts which are contemporary with the ism at hand
and which take part in the construction and consolidation of
it, or – if of negative nature – form antiprograms to it.
The most common examples of such texts are manifestos,
magazine and newspaper articles, programmes, exhibition
catalogues, etc. – all programmatic and evangelistic in form
and content. Such texts are most prominent in the initial
stages of an ism when architects and designers oppose con-
ventional practise and must seize the pen in order to express
their beliefs. The most famous examples of such texts are
probably the early modernist manifestos, which Peter Collins
describes as “pseudo-scientific mumbo-jumbo”.28 (Based on
the modernists’ fascination for science and technology) Finn
Werne proposes a paraphrase of Collins to characterise the
equally hazy post-modernist writings; “pseudo-philosophic
mumbo- jumbo”.29 (Based on the post-modernists’ fascina-
tion for philosophy)
These texts and their authors are often leading actors in
the formation of an ism, and their roles and performances
are for the most part vigorously polemic and flamboyant,
and their stand in the drama is either that of believer or
nonbeliever, avant-garde or arrière-garde.
I find the theatrical and religious metaphors utterly
suitable here. The debates are often staged much like a play;
the actors act their parts with dramatic gestures and intense
pathos. Also, most isms are surprisingly similar in structure
to religions. You will find priests, congregations, Scriptures,
relics, missionaries, pilgrimages, crusades and the lot in any
self-respecting ism.
These actors/missionaries and texts/relics are fundamental
keys to understanding isms as sociological, aesthetic, historical
and philosophical phenomena. But the above mentioned is
extremely important to bear in mind in our interpretations.
The embedded texts are dangerously alluring, deceitful and
misleading if read out of context and without proper ana-
lytic tools.
This contemporary believer/nonbeliever dichotomy is
one aspect of the insider/outsider problem. Another intriguing
aspect of it is found in the texts describing/explaining/
interpreting isms historically. Here, the believer/nonbe-
liever dichotomy fuels heavily biased writings on isms which
often take form as chronicles, falsifying or legitimatizing
history. The historiography of architecture and design in
general and of modernism in particular is saturated with
such writings.
Believers of modernism, such as Nikolaus Pevsner and
Sigfried Giedeon have in elaborate and ingenious ways tried
to show and explain the unavoidable victory of modernism,
albeit from vastly different origins.30 Nonbelievers like Charles
Jencks and Robert Venturi, on the other hand, have tried
fiercely to discredit and dismantle modernism with the same,
but opposite directed, strategy – arguments based om his-
torical necessity and determinism.31
These approaches all share a massive flaw: They are based
on a static, contemporary (with the author) notion of the
idea they set out to analyse (in this case modernism), and
extrapolate backwards in time grasping at fragments of data
which can confirm their predetermined views and thus
legitimatize or falsify the idea. The unscientific nature and
unrewarding outcome of this kind of history has long been
common knowledge within the realm of general histori-
ography. Panayotis Tournikiotis has made a timely and
intriguing contribution to the transfer of this critique to the
field of architectural historiography.32 His mapping and
critique of the long tradition of writing genealogic, projec-
ting, deterministic architectural history is important as a
potential corrective in the further development of this field
of studies.
Tournikiotis’ examples include Henry-Russell Hitchcock’s
view of history as the great procession of styles, Reyner
Banham’s use of history for legitimatizing purposes, Peter
Collins’ notion of the historian as a supplier of architectural
precedents, and Manfredo Tafuri’s political crusade. But
though he patently shows how the writing of history is
subject to the same transformative processes as any other
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cultural phenomena, even Tournikiotis regards moder-
nism as a “relatively immobile object”.33
This is another common and even less scrutinised problem
– the lack of room for or will to a more nuanced and dynamic
understanding of modernism. Openings for an interpretation
based on plurality and development within the idea are rare.
The ism is sealed, homogenized and generalized. It is turned
into what Bruno Latour describes as a black box; an impe-
netrable and unintelligible unit.34 In order to understand
the inner workings and dynamics of the ism, the black box
has to be re-opened and examined. The black-boxing of
isms also turns these ideologies into myths. This problem
has been raised and debated within the history of ideas,
with Quentin Skinner as one of the chief critics.35 But, as
Clive Dilnot has pointed out, it is high time to rid design
history as well of the writing of myths.36
Modern ISMS
Modern Architecture died in St Louis, Missouri on July 15,
1972 at 3.32 p.m. (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt-
Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks were given
the final coup de grâce by dynamite. [...] Boom, boom, boom.37
This statement from Charles Jencks’ book The Language of
Post-Modern Architecture refers to the demolition of a hous-
ing project constructed in 1952–55, designed by Minoru
Yamasaki, and is intended to demonstrate the failure and
fall of modernism. It is a punch line of dimensions and it
is so marvellously tabloid that even the father of New Jour-
nalism, Tom Wolfe, genuflects Jencks’ proclamation of death
in his crusade against modernism; From Bauhaus to Our
House.38
Jencks’ rhetoric and arguments do of course not satisfy
even the less stringent demands of academic studies – the
book is a polemic manifest. They do, however, make up an
excellent example of the need any emerging ism (in this
case post-modernism) has to ridicule and falsify the dom-
inating ideas and practices of the present in order to portray
its own ideas as new, revolutionary, seminal, and true. They
also represent the seemingly obsessive desire to view isms as
a string of strictly chronological consecutive entities, like a
line of kings.
In light of these last remarks, it becomes obvious – how-
ever strange – that Jencks (and most writers of his kind) has
not given much critical thought to the very nature of the
phenomena he so passionately debates. Jencks writes off
modernism without bothering to ponder on what an ism is,
or, for that matter, what is modern about modernism (or
post-modernism). His act is that of a true modernist – because,
like Arnfinn Bø-Rygg has pointed out:
When today – from an allegedly postmodern vantage point
– we historicise modernity or declare ourselves to have reached a
postmodern state, this is itself a modern impulse.39
Unfortunately, this sort of unscrutinised demagogy here
represented by Jencks is disturbingly common in writings
on architecture and design. As I have tried to demonstrate
on these pages, taking terms and phenomena such as modern
and isms for granted is prejudicial and results in biased
writing. Some of the most important findings of this inquiry
can become helpful guidelines for any endeavour into the
world of 20th century architecture and design.
Isms are ideologies – not scientific theories – and must
be treated as such. Studying the way the gospel is preached
might teach us more about the nature of architecture, de-
sign, and society at large than attempting to verify or falsify
the different denominations.
Isms are not necessarily comparable entities. Some, like
modernism, are extensive, ambiguous and long-lasting, while
others, like futurism, are more concise, articulate and short-
lived. Thus, they most certainly do not make up any con-
secutive, chronological line. Isms may occupy different spaces
of society, they may coexist in parallel or overlap.
Due to their differing extension and scope, one ism may
also encompass other isms. Modernism is doubtlessly the
most extensive, ambiguous and long-lasting ism of the 20th
century, and may be said to encompass a vast array of other
isms. Based on a more thorough understanding of moder-
nism’s etymology, this comprehensive and prevailing cha-
racter of the term is only strengthened.
The distinction between isms and epistemes is crucial to
bear in mind, and it becomes increasingly so when the two
appear under the same term, as they often do in the case of
modernism. The waves of the isms must not be confused with
the tides of the epistemes. This intriguing fact does most
certainly complicate any study of modernism, but it might
also be the essential key to understanding the phenomenon
and explaining its comprehensive and prevailing character.
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Isms are not solid, monolithic blocks. They are constantly
formed, transformed and reformed throughout their life-
spans by way of unceasing negotiations within the actor
networks. These processes of domestication show that isms
are dynamic, changing phenomena in constant development.
Only by appreciating this core property can isms stop being
categorizing strait jackets and become interesting and fruitful
objects of study.
These observations make for two fundamental and chal-
lenging claims. First, it seems to me that isms do not justify
their position as the primary categorizing and analytic tool
in the writing of architectural and design history. They
may, however, constitute important fields of study if analy-
sed by methods which take into account the diversity and
dynamics inherent to isms. Second, I find it hard to accept
the proclamation of death of an ideology of such vast and
comprehensive character as modernism. Modernism, from
its very conception and onwards through all its formations,
transformations and reformations, encompasses so many
ideas, beliefs, facts, structures and manifestations which
most certainly did not die on July 15, 1972 at 3.32 p.m. (or
thereabouts). Jencks might have witnessed the death of a
modernist building, he might – although doubtfully – also
have witnessed the death of a sub-(modern)ism derisively
called brutalism, but he did not witness the death of the
modern isms.
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